in number and in scale, with new temples built and old temples reconstructed. These temples address individuals as embedded members of social networks. Although their orientation and organization is still primarily local, they also trace out new and old lines of migration and trade. At the other extreme are new pietistic Buddhist movements that proselytize for new social values and create new kinds of community -globalizing, encompassing, structuring, modern. Nearly all the new religious practices rework and transform cultural and social resources that were available to Taiwanese for centuries. The newness arises because of the complexities of Taiwan's place in the current world economic and political system.
On the Edge
Taiwan's place at the literal edge of Asia-the island link between Japan, China, and southeast Asia -has shaped its political history. Most of its inhabitants before the seventeenth century were Austronesian speakers; the island was visited sometimes by Chinese or Japanese traders and occasionally used as a base by pirates. The Dutch took a kind of entrepôt-based control in the seventeenth century, only to be forcibly removed in 1661 by a Ming Dynasty loyalist using Taiwan as a last bastion against the new Qing government (a role Taiwan would later repeat). Chinese settlement increased drastically during this period, turning the island into the newest Chinese frontier and ultimately forcing the aboriginal population to sinicize or flee into the deep mountains.
The Qing Dynasty took over in 1683, but Taiwan was still very much a frontier, known for producing chronic rebellions the way other areas were known for producing scholars or silks. The Qing government had grave doubts about whether the island was really worth the investment, and Taiwan was not elevated to provincial status until 1884. Its new recognition lasted only eleven years, however. In 1895 China ceded Taiwan to Japan in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. Fifty years of Japanese colonialism followed, bringing with it pacification of endemic violence, rationalization of bureaucracy and taxation, improvements in infrastructure, and the spread of basic education. On the other hand, the colonized population lost all political say above the local level, higher education was strictly limited, and major business positions were controlled by the Japanese.
The island reverted to Chinese control after World War II, but was still considered a backwater (worse yet, a backwater heavily influenced by Japanese language and values). Relations between local Taiwanese and the new government had already deteriorated when the Communist victories of 1949 forced the Nationalist government to flee to Taiwan, taking with it as much of its wealth and military might as it could muster. The Nationalists claimed to be the only legitimate government of China, just waiting to retake the mainland from its temporary occupation by Communist bandits. Taipei was proclaimed for the moment China's capital. The nationalists declared a temporary "state of emergency"-essentially martial law -that lasted roughly forty years. For the first time, Taiwan was not just the outer edge of empire. Taiwanese, however, were as much at the edge of political power as ever.
The Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek learned their organizing techniques from the Soviet Union during an early alliance with the Communists. The Nationalist Party (Guomindang), organized along Leninist principles as a vanguard party, was present in every institution, including the military. The basic economic model was corporatist, although much of the technique of ideological control showed its common roots with the mainland. When I first visited in the late 1970s, walls were covered with slogans (Retake the Mainland!), the television offered quotes from President Chiang, and all media were tightly controlled.
This claim not to be at the edge had a weak point, of course -mainland China's alternative reading of the situation, which ultimately redefined Taiwan's position. The crucial blow came when the United States withdrew its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 1979. Diplomatically Taiwan was fully in limbo from that point on. Removed from the United Nations, it has no voice in international treaties. Its claims to be a state are recognized by only a handful of the world's least powerful countries. Thoughts of giving up claims to China and becoming a new nation are immediately squelched by saber-rattling from the mainland. In addition, Taiwan was not part of China during the first half of the twentieth century, when ideas about Chinese nationalism developed most strongly. In a world organized by nation-states, Taiwan falls between all the boundaries.
The dilemmas this poses strengthened further after martial law was finally lifted in 1987. In the years that followed, local people could, for the first time in a century, speak explicitly about what it meant to be Taiwanese, in contrast to the Chinese they had been for the previous four decades, and the colonial Japanese they had been for the five decades before that. More than any other issue since 1987, the problem of identity has preoccupied Taiwan. When the government stepped back from its uncompromising paternalistic moralism, it left an empty field in which anything seemed possible. This new free space, added to Taiwan's irresolvable political position, has fostered the religious creativity we now see there.
Taiwan's economy is not as unusual as its current political situation, but the island's history has also fostered an economic edginess. From early on, Chinese settlers in Taiwan had been market oriented. By the nineteenth century much of the island's agricultural production was directed toward the market rather than subsistence use. Taiwan was the major supplier of tea to the United States after the Civil War, and it exported its rice and sugar cane to mainland China and southeast Asia. The Japanese built up the agricultural base still further and invested heavily in infrastructure; Taiwan was to become a rice basket for Japan. When Chiang Kai-shek and his followers took over in 1949, they followed a developmental state model. They actively promoted key economic sectors through state-owned companies or the promotion of private industry, and their tight political control enforced docility in the labor force. Under a generally corporatist model, Taiwan's economy grew steadily. By the 1960s Taiwan was attracting the cheap labor industries that ride at the front of capitalism's advance. In Taiwan this included both textiles-the classic leading edge of the cheap labor frontier since they first moved from England to New England-and newer industrial manufacture like cheap plastic toys and electronics.
This story of tough political rule and enlightened economic leadership could often be heard from Nationalist officials. The economy has another side, however. Quite unlike Japan or South Korea, the heart of Taiwan's economic growth has been very small-scale entrepreneurs, not the gigantic companies that work closely within state policy. Taiwanese bosses complain that workers stay around only long enough to learn the business, and then set themselves up as competition. There is a cliché in Taiwan that it is "better to be a chicken's beak than a bull's behind" (ning wei jikou, bu wei niuhou), and in fact by some estimates one of every eight adults in Taiwan is the boss of his or her own small business. 1 The government has not exactly hindered this growth, but has also done very little to foster it directly. For example, tight banking policy has long made it almost impossible for small businesses to obtain credit. As a result Taiwanese turn to the informal economy. Primary sources of credit thus include postdated checks and rotating credit associations. 2 None of these techniques have formal legal backing, and so all rely on informal networks of social trust to succeed. Entrepreneurs, potential entrepreneurs (which includes almost everyone), and even people working at household-based piecework production must develop and maintain ego-centered networks of connections to do well.
The 1980s brought economic transformations almost as great as Taiwan's political changes of the period. As the economy thrived, costs of labor increased until it made little sense to continue investing in the production of footwear, textiles, and injection-molded plastic. The crisis was not so much that multinational companies left for greener pastures, but that Taiwanese entrepreneurs could no longer compete in these businesses, even despite the traditional advantages provided by household labor. Their small scale, however, meant that they did not usually have enough capital to move into high technology and capital-intensive sectors. The logical solution would have been for them to invest overseas in the industries they already knew (and this has happened in the 1990s). At the time, however, government currency regulations and political fears of China -the most obvious source of cheap labor -prevented people from exporting their money. The result was a lot of unproductive investment, especially speculation in the stock and real estate markets (both of which crashed a few years later). Taiwan became a gambler's economy in which earlier values of hard work and savings no longer explained profits.
This changed again in the 1990s when barriers to overseas investment were largely removed and Taiwanese entrepreneurs rushed into the opportunities. Taiwan is the largest single investor in Vietnam, and a very large investor in parts of China. This fosters a new mode of precariousness, with the constant specter of political or economic turmoil threatening to undermine investments. For all these political and economic reasons, and in spite of the wealth so much of the population has achieved, Taiwan is not an easy place to sit back and feel secure. All of these changes have intertwined with religious life in Taiwan, which has undergone several decades of creative expansion and seems to thrive on Taiwan's general uncertainty.
Of Dogs and Death
A number of previously obscure temples suddenly became prominent in Taiwan in the mid-1980s, just as the gambling economy thrived. The most famous was the Eighteen Lords temple at the northern tip of the island, rebuilt in the 1970s in the shadow of a nuclear power plant. 3 There had been a small ghost shrine (which Living at the Edge nobody could date) where the plant was erected. Ghost shrines are usually small, but this was even smaller than usual -too small to have been recorded -not much more than a grave and an incense pot. According to most people who told me the story, a fishing boat had washed ashore sometime in the past, carrying seventeen unidentified dead bodies and one live dog. As is customary, locals buried the bodies in a mass grave, which they marked with a shrine. The ceremony was disrupted when the dog, loyal to the death (a value most associated with upright ministers, good business partners, and powerful bandits), leaped into the grave after its dead masters and was buried alive. Seventeen corpses and one suicidal dog: the Eighteen Lords.
For years soldiers on coastal sentry duty would on occasion worship at the shrine, but not many others. When construction of the nuclear power plant began in the 1970s, the land around the plant was to be shored up, causing the shrine to be buried. Popular sentiment and eerie experience, however, convinced the government to preserve the shrine. A number of workers had died in construction accidents (often taken as a sign of unhappy ghosts), and a backhoe mysteriously froze just as it stood poised to destroy the original little shrine. These events helped mobilize both workers and neighbors to lobby against destruction. The government ultimately agreed "to respect local customs" by building a new temple directly over the old shrine. This new temple is quite magnificent by ghostcult standards. On one side of the temple are images of the Eighteen Lords, and on the other side is the grave, flanked by two large bronze statues of the dog. This grave is a simulacrum of the original (both are mosaic tile-covered mounds), which is now preserved in an underground room directly below its replica. The genuine grave, reached through an unmarked basement staircase in the back of the temple, is said to be the true center of power.
Ghosts symbolize improper deaths: they are the spirits of people who have no descendants to worship them because they died young or (like the Eighteen Lords) by means of violent death far from home. Unlike gods, ghosts will grant any request because, lacking descendants to worship them, they are starving in the underworld -this explains their fondness for any paying proposition. Their only condition is proper repayment (buying them gold medals, giving money to their temple, sponsoring operas for their pleasure), without which they will exact a nasty revenge. This is fee-for-service religion, something like cutting a deal with a local hoodlum. Ghosts have long had this greedy and individualistic streak, in contrast to the community-based and upright morality of gods. One of the most obvious ritual statements of this difference occurs in ritual offerings of incense. Gods receive incense in single pots that combine the smoky offerings of entire worshipping communities. At their annual propitiation ritual, ghosts instead receive separate, single sticks of incense (often marked with the name of the donor) stuck into plates of food. Worshipers are individualized, and any sense of community is minimized.
The Eighteen Lords differ from this normally shadowy corner of Taiwanese religion only in having suddenly jumped into the open. By the late 1980s, the Eighteen Lords temple may have been the most popular temple on the island. Thousands of people visited every night, knotting up traffic on the north coastal highway. People said it was especially popular with prostitutes, gamblers, and petty criminals. Visitors were warned to watch for pickpockets who came both to worship and to steal. In fact, all kinds of people made offerings, and talismans from the temple could be seen everywhere -rearview mirrors, fish restaurants, fancy hotels. 4 Bending the government to its will accounted for the initial fame of this temple. But its boom really began in the mid-1980s with the rise in popularity of temples like this to shady characters who offered ritual efficacy for morally suspect fees.
The Eighteen Lords emphasized the departure from community and conventional morality that their worship encouraged through a series of reversals. People worshipped there at night, and the center of power was underground at the original grave. Instead of offering sticks of incense at the grave, they erected lit cigarettes. A wall now blocks access to the grave from the front (where the incense pot stands), so the cigarettes must be offered from behind. The trip from parking lot to temple was equally carnivalesque: unorganized crowds made their way towards the temple amid rows of carnival games (shoot the balloons, knock over the ducks, and all the rest). And as a reminder of the driving force behind it all, everyone asked for cash. Even the toilets were fee-for-service.
The temple spawned more than its share of commercial offshoots. These included souvenir dogs (I saw one on an altar in a small business, smoking a lit cigarette) but more significantly a movie, a television soap opera, and even a fake temple a bit closer to town on the same highway. 5 One subplot from the movieit was postmodern itself, all subplots and no plot-was particularly striking. The heroine of the moment was a beautiful prostitute, stuck in debt bondage to her 4. Temple employees who help worshippers read the poetic talismans that are part of standard temple divination see a wide range of people and listen to their personal situations. These employees invariably told me that the people who came to this temple seemed no different from those at any other temple. The Eighteen Lords temple allows visitors the frisson of thinking they are rubbing elbows with gangsters and prostitutes, without actually forcing them to do it. pimp. Her handsome boyfriend was a gambler who could not win enough money to buy her freedom. The boyfriend's clownish sidekick came to the rescue by worshipping the Eighteen Lords. As he was leaving the temple, a book blew open to disclose a formula for successful gambling. To follow the formula the gambler needed a talisman made from the umbilical cord of a newborn baby, although the book also warns that the fate of the baby will be damaged. By happy coincidence, the sidekick's wife had just given birth: the father ripped the cord off the wailing baby in the hospital, and soon everyone's problems were solved (except, I imagine, the baby's, whose story the film drops). The film itself looks like a quick attempt to profit from the temple's popularity, but its greed and its plots align well with the principles at play in worship of the Eighteen Lords.
This image of ghosts is not new in Taiwanese (or more generally Chinese) culture, but its sudden surge in popularity by the late 1980s was a significant change. In part, this temple and others like it -one to a murdered thief, another to an executed bank robber -thrived by revealing winning numbers for an illegal lottery that also grew in popularity during this period. As a form of the numbers game, this lottery gave fairly high odds of success for a temple that could ambiguously suggest three or four digits. With thousands of worshipers looking for signs in the incense smoke or through divination techniques, the odds on any given day that a devotee would win were not bad. People said that standard community gods were unwilling to help people gamble. But lottery numbers were only part of the explanation for the new prominence of these temples. The sudden flowering of the illegal lottery during these years also demands explanation-a state-run lottery had existed for many years without such competition.
What the illegal lottery and these newly popular fee-for-service temples held in common was the prospect of unearned wealth. Their popularity increased in the late 1980s because of the specific economic and political conditions of the period. First, the suspension of martial law opened a moral free space for new social practices, including worship of the Eighteen Lords. Second, although people had achieved the standard of living that is usually associated with developed countries, they were also caught in a momentary economic vise: with surplus money and nowhere productive to put it, unproductive investments that might lead to unearned wealth seemed to make sense. When this situation changed in the 1990s, especially as Taiwanese were increasingly able to invest in mainland China, both the Eighteen Lords and the illegal lottery faded in importance.
The Eighteen Lords and similar temples seem playfully postmodern. Who could better symbolize the apparent loss of shared values than a pile of unrecognized dead bodies? They inflict no set morality. They do not even suggest a morality by favoring an immorality; they just do not care about such issues. Their space is restless and chaotic, always filled with masses of people, but never the same people. No one has the authority to impose a unified interpretation on this, nor do interpretive social mechanisms exist that might order it. Even the movie made no attempt at a unified reading of the temple. These ghosts are radically individualistic, serving people's selfish ends without regard for older social ties like family or community, and without any effective means to foster a unified, authoritative meaning.
Gods and Networks
These ghost temples stood out partly because, for the first time, they began to rival community god temples. Most gods, like ghosts, are spirits of dead people. But unlike ghosts, gods are known for their upright acts before or after death, or both. Many people worship ancestral spirits and nonancestral gods at home altars. The most important god temples, however, are run by local community committees. There is no priesthood affiliated with these temples, although Daoist or Buddhist priests may be hired to conduct rituals. Nor is there any institutional organization beyond individual temples. Some nearby temples are connected historically through "incense division," in which a branch temple starts up by bringing incense from the mother temple and usually reaffirms the tie annually by making a pilgrimage to the mother temple. Maintenance of such ties is evidence of historical roots and ongoing economic or social connections. Overseas communities often maintain ties to their home communities through incense division networks.
In many respects worship of community gods is contrary to Western conceptions of religion. For example, one of my earliest impressions in Taiwan was that my anthropological instincts about sacred and profane were defied. This was not just the observation that religion and daily life were inextricably intertwined; I was much more struck by the absence of sacred space in rituals. Early in my first extended field research I observed a Buddhist altar that had been set up to feed the lonely ghosts during the seventh lunar month. During the ceremony people walked up to the monk conducting the ritual, surrounded the altar, and even grabbed objects from the altar. Temple altars are normally very approachable, and gods, when they physically appear through spirit mediums, are so approachable that people just sit around and have ordinary conversations with them. This sense reflects popular attitudes, though it is not a priestly view of things -the Buddhist monk had busily created a meditational mandala around himself, and a glance at temple architecture shows a division of sacred space. Furthermore, there was not even a clear translation of the term "religion" into Chinese before the twentieth century, when China borrowed the term from Japan, which got it in turn from Western philosophy. A number of older informants still do not recognize the term today, and among those who do many deny that they have any religion (meaning something institutionalized, textual, priestly) and will say only that they "carry incense" ( gia: hiu:).
The distinction between the worlds of commerce and religion also never was very applicable in Taiwan. Any act of worship beyond a minimal lighting of incense requires burning "spirit money." The most common forms of spirit money in Taiwan are cheap squares of paper decorated with gold or silver foil. (In Hong Kong some look like secular currency inscribed with the English words "Bank of Hell.") In contrast to the fee-for-service ghosts, however, people do not talk about money for gods as fixing a contractual relationship or as bribery. Instead, the image is of the reciprocity through which people build community and personal networks. For instance, in her book on Chinese ritual and politics, anthropologist Emily Martin Ahern quotes a Taiwanese worshipper as follows: "Police act one way to people who give them red envelopes [bribes] and another way to those who do not. But gods are not like that. It is not that the more things you give them the more they will help you. It is only necessary to do good deeds and burn three sticks of incense and they will be enormously happy. A god is a being with a very upright heart." 6 This is a very different conceptualization from the repayment to ghosts, but it also shows the general comfort with commerce beyond the marketplace in Taiwan. The standard wedding or funeral gift, for example, is cash.
God temples in Taiwan have also thrived over the last few decades, although they have not enjoyed the spectacular spurt of growth that ghost temples briefly did. They have increased in both quantity (the number of temples per capita has been rising since about 1972) and quality (as older temples are rebuilt on larger scales and at great expense). 7 Some of these temples are entrepreneurial, especially those associated with spirit mediums. A contractual relationship between the client and the human spirit medium (but not the deity) is also involved. This sector has grown like any other petty capitalist product -mediums have multiplied the number of deities on their altars because different gods fit different market niches, and mediums innovate new techniques in competition with each other. 8 The appeal to market segmentation in religion corresponds to the general fracturing of marketing to fit the disunities of the population.
The most important temples are still those dedicated to community gods. These temples are uncompromisingly local in orientation. Other towns may have temples to the same deities, and some deities are nationally recognized, but each god in his or her temple looks primarily after just the locality. Many of these temples have recently been rebuilt at great expense. Lists of contributors and their financial gifts are typically posted outside temples, and these donors are often featured in videos of major rituals produced by the temples. Giving money to a temple claims a relationship of reciprocity simultaneously with both the gods and the local community, declaring community membership and asserting the right to future social and supernatural support (often by wealthy people who no longer live there). Rebuilding a local temple or contributing money to its ritual life are in part ways of solidifying the social networks that are so crucial to Taiwan's mom-and-pop capitalism. Gods and patrons are intertwined in these obligations, which are concretized in the increasingly ornate forms of the temples themselves.
The networks that trace historical connections between temples remain as important as ever, above all because Taiwan's current rage for investment in China encourages entrepreneurs to revivify temple ties to their ancestral homelands, where they plan to invest. Mainland China relaxes its usual glare at popular religious practice in these areas, recognizing that Taiwanese investment in local temples also eases the flow of capital for other purposes. Temples are thriving on both sides of the Taiwan Strait as symbols and mediators of new economic ties. Anthropologist Brigitte Baptandier provides an example of the ironies that can result. Back when representatives of Taiwanese temples could not visit the mainland, she brought a Taiwanese version of a temple text concerning the goddess Linshui Furen to the mother temple in Fujian Province. A few years later the mother temple held a conference on the goddess, and the organizers were able to invite their Taiwanese counterparts. They reprinted the text and gave it to the Tai-wanese, who happily brought it back as evidence of their own renewed authenticity. 9 On the other hand, Taiwanese feel a new kind of power in these relationships -they are now returning as magnates, not prodigal sons -and this sometimes shows up in claims that Taiwanese images are more authentic than those from the mainland. 10 Taiwan's odd political position also plays out through temples. Two of Taiwan's most famous temples are dedicated to the goddess Mazu. The temple in Beigang is considered senior to the temple in Dajia, which hosted a famous pilgrimage to Beigang every year. When travel to the mainland became possible, members of the Beigang temple initially refused to go, in what amounted to a claim of their temple's own ultimate authenticity. On the other hand, jumping at the chance to go to the original mother temple, members of the Dajia temple brought back incense and then claimed seniority to the Beigang temple. These events were islandwide gossip for a while, and widely interpreted as Beigang support for Taiwan independence and Dajia support for reunification. Temples have thrived as the nodes of economic and political networks but remain subject to the intricate particularities of Taiwan's unusual economy and unique politics.
On Sects
Yet another religious growth area in Taiwan comes from the rise of several indigenous pietistic sects, loosely related to earlier Chinese traditions like the White Lotus. 11 A wide range of such groups now exists, making it difficult to generalize about them. The largest and most influential pietistic sect in Taiwan today is the Way of Unity (Yiguan Dao), which claims over a million followers. Its members run most of the vegetarian restaurants in Taiwan and include one of the wealthiest men in the world, the shipping magnate Zhang Rongfa. The sect is currently planning to build a university.
Many of the sects are millenarian. Their temples often have large statues of Maitreya, the Buddha of the next age, whom members say is (or will soon be) on earth. Many sects also worship a goddess, the Eternal Venerable Mother (Wusheng Laomu), who created the world but is now saddened and disappointed by her children's lack of morality. Nearly all these sects give a prominent place to spirit writing, in which a deity writes commentaries in sand through a possessed medium using a planchette. Most sectarians are also self-consciously syncretic, drawing on Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism and sometimes crossing the globe for their religious resources. For instance, in a spirit-writing text published by one of these groups there is a transcript of a panel discussion involving the "founders of the five religions": the Primordial Heavenly Worthy (central to Daoism), Sakyamuni, Confucius, Mohammed, and Jehovah. The moderator is Guan Gong, the popular Chinese god of war, business, and loyalty. 12 The message is that all the religions of the world share the same basic message of morality.
The sects claim to be moral revivals in an era of moral crisis. They unite large numbers of followers around clear leaders and clear sets of ideas. They come together as ordered groups-the word congregation is tempting. This is very different from the relatively disorganized and disaggregated popular worship of gods and especially ghosts. Many of the sects emphasize this orderliness through the body. For example, pietistic sectarians typically wear blue or white robes over their clothing when they worship or conduct spirit-writing sessions, a significant departure from usual ritual practice. They tend to worship in neat rows with coordinated movements and segregation by gender (men on the left in standard Confucian order); this contrasts with the unorganized worship typical of community god temples, and even more with the total chaos of the Eighteen Lords. Unlike popular temples where anyone can walk in and worship, sect membership is voluntary and strongly marked in dress and behavior. Distinctions between sacred and profane are now relevant, as the select are distinguished from others. Having become accustomed to the nonsacred nature of much ritual space, when I first visited sectarian temples I was surprised that I was not allowed to approach the altars, or sometimes even to see the god. As part of this delineation of sacred space, money has also been removed from the ritual-there is no spirit money in any form. This is not to say that sectarians oppose either the market economy or Taiwan's modernist state. Their new morality is anything but revolutionary. In the sectarian panel discussion I mentioned above, for instance, the Primordial Heavenly Worthy -perhaps conscious of the political "state of emergency" at the time -offers a summary of the panel's conclusions: "Those who cultivate the Dao should respect the Constitution, be faithful to the nation, be faithful to human plans, not abandon the laws, and behave as good citizens. . . . [They] should be filial to their parents, carefully attend to their funeral rites, and make sacrifices to them." 13 Most of the groups in fact trumpet the market success of their members, arguing in Weberian fashion that sect members make good business connections because of the understanding that comes from sharing the same moral position, even with strangers. Some sects also have a calculation of the profit and loss of the self-each convert is supposed to accumulate enough merit to achieve individual salvation. 14 These sects offer an overarching morality that is comfortable with the market, but uncomfortable with what is seen as the moral failing of society. Like revived god temples, but even more powerfully, they help establish networks of likeminded people that have been crucial to Taiwan's economic expansion. Like the ghost cults, they celebrate the market but with a very different moral message. While ghosts enjoy exactly the loss of a shared sense of morality and revel in the reduction of all relationships to commodity exchange, the sects attempt to rebuild moralities and to construct communities on a new basis. Ghosts relish living at the edge -quite appropriate for liminal beings -but the sects react against it. These sects remain very important in Taiwan but have been overshadowed by another form of organized religion, based more purely in Buddhism.
On Charity and Compassion
Roughly simultaneous with the beginning of the Eighteen Lords enthusiasm and the increased popularity of sectarian religion in the 1970s, Taiwan also saw a resurgence in various sorts of Buddhism. I will concentrate here on the largest of these groups, the Compassionate Relief Merit Association (Ciji Gongdehui). Claiming about 4 million members, it is the only social association in Taiwan larger than the Nationalist Party. 15 It gives away over U.S. $20 million each year in charity, and many followers also volunteer large amounts of time visiting the poor or working in the Compassionate Relief hospital in Hualian, where the movement began. Compassionate Relief is led by a frail but charismatic Buddhist nun named Zhengyan. The vast majority of followers are lay people, and the group does not emphasize joining the sangha, the order of Buddhist monks and nuns. Zhengyan began her movement on Taiwan's poor east coast in 1966 with five disciples and thirty housewives who contributed a few cents a day and sewed children's shoes to support medical charity. Now the group has branches around the world, runs a university, and is building their second cutting-edge hospital. Like the Eighteen Lords and some other Buddhist groups, it grew slowly and steadily through the 1970s and expanded very rapidly in the 1980s. Its popularity has outlasted that of ghost temples. Compassionate Relief is almost matched in scale by a few other Buddhist groups such as Buddha Light Mountain (Fuoguang Shan) and Dharma Drum Mountain (Fagu Shan).
Compassionate Relief is notable for its concern with secular action. It downplays many traditional aspects of Buddhism in Taiwan such as sutra singing and philosophical discussion. The emphasis is consistently on changing this world and creating a Pure Land on earth by bringing the Buddhist message of simplicity and compassion into all aspects of people's lives. The followers are about 80 percent women, who until recently wore identical conservative dresses (the dresses are now differentiated by rank). Followers gather periodically in small groups to carry out charitable works, and in larger groups to listen to Zhengyan's sermons (either in person or on video) or to member testimonials about their new lives. 16 The sermons are light on Buddhist text and heavy on action in the world. Zhengyan is known for her terse advice on how to live with problems, not how to transcend them. She urges people to cut down on conspicuous consumption and to devote their resources and energy to helping the poor and sick.
Member testimonials, like their Protestant counterparts, tend to contrast current happiness with former lives of dissolution and dissatisfaction. At a testimonial in 1995 one woman said, "I used to have closets full of clothes. None of them ever seemed beautiful enough to satisfy me. But now I have found that most beautiful dress. It is the one I am wearing [the Compassionate Relief uniform]." A few even relate tales of changing loyalties from the Eighteen Lords to Zhengyan -feral religion tamed again. A consistent theme in discussions about conversion to Compassionate Relief is the first viewing of Zhengyan, when visi-tors are often lost in uncontrollable weeping in the presence of their frail leader. I have seen families prostrate themselves at her feet with tears flowing down their cheeks.
Much of the movement is about the remaking of the self -the charismatic transition through tears in the presence of Zhengyan, the messages of the testimonials, the instruction to volunteer among the poor and sick. The new self is molded just as much in the bodily practices of daily life. Serious followers keep a vegetarian diet and are required to abstain from alcohol-a primary lubricant for much business in Taiwan. Followers are even instructed to wear their seatbelts. The uniforms, like those of the pietistic sects, help mark group membership; they contrast as much with individualistic daily dress as their carefully constructed group ceremonies contrast with the disorganized daily worship at temples. 17 Compassionate Relief uniforms also carry their own specific meanings. Worn over everyday clothing, sectarian robes emphasize distinctions between the sacred and profane and highlight the necessity of purity when dealing with deities. Their traditional design also promotes the general feeling in those groups of a revival of Confucian tradition. Compassionate Relief uniforms, on the other hand, are more like everyday dresses. The emphasis is thus on the secular world, rather than the sacred world of sectarian temples.
Compassionate Relief is not an antimarket movement by any means, but it does look to heal the moral problems of the market-based universe. Like many moral revivals, it discourages consumption and encourages social relations outside of contract and commerce. Charity, after all, is a fundamentally nonmarket way of redistributing wealth, although its money often comes initially from the market. Historically in China this combination of Buddhism and charity is new (even begging by monks was downplayed there), but popularizing Buddhist groups and private charitable organizations have long histories of and close ties to the rise of the commodity economy in China. For example, the rise in philanthropic associations in the late Ming Dynasty (sixteenth century) was a response to an influx of Spanish silver. By joining with local Confucian elites in philanthropic ventures that addressed social problems, newly rich merchants were able to justify their new wealth. 18 Compassionate Relief gave the practice a Buddhist form and assigned women the leading role, but it also helps answer the old moral problems of new wealth. That is why this group -unlike, for instance, many of the Japanese "new religions"-appeals particularly to the wealthy. Many of the other new pietistic and Buddhist movements now also command enormous followings and huge pots of money, and philanthropy serves similar functions for them. Two have opened or are planning universities, and Buddha Light Mountain was involved in the U.S. presidential campaign contribution scandal of 1996.
Buddhist groups and pietistic sects promise a moral compass at a time when people feel that their older moralities are crumbling under the economic and political pressures of current Taiwanese life. They refocus market profits into nonmarket activities, cleansing the cash in good causes. Among the new religious movements, Compassionate Relief is the most worldly, and also the most popular with women. These issues are probably related: The movement offers a way of maintaining the conservative image of women as nurturing mothers and the valuation of a "simple" life, while breaking down the related social barriers that had limited women's activities to the family. The pietistic sects lean instead more toward revitalized Confucianism, which is clearly less appealing to women. 19 Compassionate Relief also thrived at this particular moment for political reasons. Another Buddhist reformer, a monk named Yinshun, had been silenced by the Buddhist establishment (with government support) in the 1950s because his work seemed too close to leftist agitation. However, by the 1970s, when Compassionate Relief began to grow, Taiwan's authoritarian government had become staunchly laissez-faire on social issues. Swayed largely by neoclassical economics (in spite of their large state-owned sector), they kept taxation low in exchange for providing little welfare, unemployment, or health benefits. This began to change only after 1987, when democratization changed the political dynamics of offering social services. Given Taiwan's economic direction at the time, it was convenient for the government that Compassionate Relief met genuine social needs without government involvement. Zhengyan has never offered direct political support to the government and is generally seen as independent, but there is, no doubt, a happy coincidence of purpose.
Why This? Why Now?
Anthropologists in Taiwan in the early 1970s tended to think indigenous forms of religion were fading away. This notion may in part have been a remnant of modernization theory assumptions that secularization was inevitable, but it was also Living at the Edge supported by crude statistical measures for religion, like registered temples per capita. 20 Growth in indigenous forms of religion began in the early 1970s and has generally continued unabated, although individual movements can ebb and flow over just a few years. This growth coincides roughly with the period when Taiwan moved firmly into an export-oriented economic policy with minimal state support of society beyond education and infrastructure -the kind of model that has more recently become the general liberal economic prescription for the entire world. Taiwan did very well under these policies, but its success also encouraged the economic worries of the 1980s (as cheap labor gradually dried up) and the political worries of the 1990s (as democratization has pushed the issue of independence or reunification to the point of ongoing identity crisis).
It is not enough to point out that modernization theorists misunderstood the relationship between secularization and capitalism. Taiwan is hardly unique in casting doubt on that theory, or in experiencing the kinds of moral doubts that religion can address. Nor is it enough to point out that these religious developments respond roughly to market pressures that are not unusual around the world -an uneasy combination of growing individualism in a Hobbesian world of competition and contract, combined with an attempt to create new forms of community. Instead, it seems worth exploring why Taiwan's animated, vigorous, and diverse set of religious possibilities takes the particular forms it has at this historical moment. At one side the Eighteen Lords wildly celebrate the moral freedoms of the individual in the market. At the same time, resurgent god cults help solidify business networks, and organized religious movements offer entirely new moral communities. One can move from the chaotic midnight mass of self-interested worshipers to neat congregations of identical followers; we see fads for nameless and homeless ghosts, for gods with communitarian loyalties, for charismatic and saintly leaders. Some people, in fact, switched almost overnight from ardent followers of ghosts and gambling to loyal welfare workers for Compassionate Relief. As Taiwan has thrived in the new capitalist world it has simultaneously become more localizing and more universalizing, pushed market competition and charitable redistribution, celebrated individualism and constructed social values, wallowed in disorderly ghosts and crafted new kinds of order. It is both postmodern and modern, together and inseparable.
Part of the answer to the particularities of Taiwan's current religious vigor lies in its long history of involvement in global trade, market economies, and borderland politics. While the configuration of the world economy in the late twentieth century is of course new, China -and especially Taiwan -already had an intimate familiarity with things like cash and contracts. Neither the political tension of Taiwan's current limbo nor the economic edginess of life in a changeable commodity economy are new for Chinese. In China's history political edges abound: There are international and domestic regional boundaries where communication and political control have been difficult and where the strength of non-Chinese ethnic groups made social interactions more complex. Taiwan nearly always fit this category, although the events of the last few decades have made its position even more anomalous. Especially during periods of political weakness in China, these edgy places have sprouted unusual religious growths. Peripheral Guangxi in the 1840s, for example, was just such a place, and one of its main deities at the time was King Gan, who had achieved high office by murdering his mother and burying her in a grave whose geomancy was said to guarantee his future success. Other deities in the area included a sexually licentious couple and a dung-throwing vagrant. Speaking through possessed spirit mediums, several deities extorted money from innocent passers-by. 21 This was distant indeed from the image of upright bureaucratic gods promoted in most areas.
China's earlier surges of market and commodity dominance also had religious interactions. In addition to the rise of philanthropic associations and popularizing Buddhism in the late Ming, another case that resonates today was the 1768 wave of soul stealing in China. A piece of a victim's hair, or a victim's written name, was allegedly used for someone else's personal gain; the victim-often a childwas robbed of his spiritual essence and would soon waste away and die. 22 This was a period of economic prosperity in China (after the British began to buy Chinese tea but before they wreaked their opium revenge), and the accusations occurred in China's wealthiest region. In this area where there had been a recent rapid population increase, the new wealth led to a general freeing of peasant labor, but only to enter a buyer's labor market. This was not capitalism, but it was a form of market culture based in rapid commercialization and its social effects.
Even the great variety of religious options in Taiwan today is not new. Religion has not been strongly institutionalized in China since the Song dynasty dropped the earlier idea of adopting Buddhism or Daoism as a state religion. Correspondingly, for centuries most religion in China and Taiwan has been either strictly locally controlled in community temples or only loosely centralized through rival centers of Buddhist and Daoist ordination. Most worship has been performed within the home, overseen by no higher authority. Under these circumstances, China and Taiwan have long brewed a wide variety of local religious options, and there is little institutional obstacle to change compared to Christianity or Islam.
These historical precedents in part explain Taiwan's reaction to millennial capitalism. But the movements I have discussed are not simple continuations of earlier religious ideas, even though each one has direct precursors. Rather, they differ from earlier movements because they are integral parts of Taiwan's recent economic and political transformations, which are not just a reiteration of earlier bouts of commercialization or political weakness. One aspect of this change in the global context is communication, including both through the media and transportation. The new ease of movement has allowed people and temples to act on larger scales than ever before, including the international stage for Compassionate Relief (it has branches in nineteen countries), the new levels of interaction between Taiwanese and mainland temples, and even the islandwide popularity of the Eighteen Lords temple. New media play just as strong a role: the Eighteen Lords spawned a movie and a television soap opera, community temples hawk souvenir videos of major rituals, and important clergy like Zhengyan frequently preach on television.
The specific forms of religion today in Taiwan are unique, both in comparison to their historical antecedents and to comparable religious resurgences in other parts of the world. The Eighteen Lords cult, for example, aggrandizes ghosts beyond anything documented earlier in China or Taiwan. As a ghost temple, it differs fundamentally from the unruly god cults of 1840s Guangxi. In some ways it is more similar to the recent growth in many parts of the world of what Jean and John Comaroff call "occult economies," which generally paint a Hobbesian world of all against all, with individualism run rampant and amoral self-interest the only goal. 23 There is rarely any institutional structure beyond the locality, and while the themes draw on indigenous traditions, they also reflect a rapid transnational flow in the cultural capital of evil.
These religions are all feral in a sense, but Taiwan's Eighteen Lords are also quite different from the others, including the South African case the Comaroffs document in detail. South Africa has seen an epidemic of witchcraft accusations, sometimes culminating in the murder of the "witch" by the old revolutionary means of necklacing. The accused witches are said to be wealthy, old, and infertile. One common theme is that they murder people and revive their bodies to work as agricultural slaves at night. During the day the zombified bodies are stored in metal oil drums. Other tales tell of the harvest of human body parts, ideally from freshly slaughtered children, to make magic potions for personal gain. The epidemic of witchcraft accusations, and the very real violence that results from it, has been serious enough to spawn government commissions of enquiry. In great contrast to this grim portrait, Taiwan's version of fee-for-service religion is essentially playful, not evil. The difference reflects the very different experiences of capitalism so far by Taiwanese, and especially the great success of Taiwan's particular form of networked mom-and-pop entrepreneurs. Rampant selfinterest does not seem quite so evil when most people have clearly thrived on it. Indeed, the Taiwanese Eighteen Lords are as much a celebration of capitalist greed as a damnation of it.
Community god temples in Taiwan are the closest thing to a simple revival of what was already there. Even they, however, are caught up in the new systems. They are part of the rapid cross-strait expansion of personal networks as economic investment opportunities have grown over the last decade. Partly for this reason, they have also become crucial to the new local and international politics of identity. This is evidenced by arguments about relative "authenticity" of ritual and iconography and about independence and reunification versions of a goddess. More locally, the new role of community temple religion appears when political candidates behead a cock in front of the community god to prove the seriousness of their promises, or when temples help organize local environmental demonstrations. Temples and local political power have long had an intimate relationship, but democratization has helped change its nature. At still larger scales the pietistic sects claim a relation to market success that is new in their history, and the Buddhist moralizing of Compassionate Relief is part of a transformation in women's social position.
These changes correlate to Taiwan's complex and weakly institutionalized religious history and to Taiwan's specific adaptations to its unusual economics and politics. In part, Taiwan's current identity crisis is the result of the growth of networked capitalism during its decades along the global cheap-labor frontier that has now moved farther west into China and southeast Asia. In part, the identity crisis is also the creation of its anomalous political world. Identity in Taiwan is in so much flux both because the island has no place in a world of nation-states and because of its market experience. Were it not for the political loosening after martial law, the consequent explosion of worry about what it means to be Tai-wanese, and the international (or intranational-that confusion itself is the problem) conundrums it has created, religious culture in Taiwan would look rather different. Taiwan's wide range of indigenous alternatives reflects its fragmented identities as a postmodern economy in a nonnation-nonstate, less certain of its religious certainties than in other places and other times. Its rich religious cultures evolved around the tensions of modernity in its particular historical context, but their specific realizations require us to look to the forms of life that characterize the edges of the economic and political worlds, shaped by the convergence of their histories and a new world system. 
